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RECOUPMENT: APPLES, ORANGES AND

FRUIT BASKET TURNOVER'
David G. Epstein *
Jonathan A. Nockels**

"[O1nly apples can be recouped against apples, not apples against

oranges. Apples may be set off against oranges, but this takes the
*"2
matter out of the nature of recoupment.
HIS is an article about the nature of the right of recoupment in
bankruptcy. It is not an article about apples or oranges or how to
figure out whether a fruit basket is all apples or all oranges. It is
instead an article in part about how to distinguish apples from oranges in
bankruptcy proceedings, and in part about the fruit basket turnover that
can result when the nature of recoupment in bankruptcy is not fully
understood.
In sum, we understand the scope of recoupment in bankruptcy to be no
different from the scope of recoupment outside of bankruptcy: if it is "apples and apples" outside of bankruptcy, it is "apples and apples" in bankruptcy. And we understand that there are a lot of really smart
3
bankruptcy judges and lawyers and law professors who do not yet share
this understanding.
Misunderstanding the nature of the right of recoupment in bankruptcy
is understandable. After all, the Bankruptcy Code nowhere uses the term
"recoupment" and neither did the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Nonetheless,
reported opinions from proceedings in bankruptcy cases have used the
I. Using Westlaw, we could find numerous cases and articles that use the phrase
"fruit basket turnover" (or "turn-over"). None of them included any attribution. A
website, http://www.gingergever.com/artstories/amosbasket.html, and an outstanding
librarian at the SMU Underwood Law Library, Laura Justiss, traced the phrase to a
quotation from Amos 8:1-2, and Caravaggio's painting, The Supper at Emmaus.
* David Epstein [DEl is a Professor of Law at the Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law. He is grateful to the Law School for its generous grant and to
Jonathan Nockels for his invaluable assistance, both of which made this article possible.
** Jonathan Nockels is the William L. Hutchinson Scholar at the Southern Methodist
University Dedman School of Law and is grateful for not paying tuition.
2. In re Delicruz, 300 B.R. 669, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003).
3. Including at least one of the co-authors of a classic bankruptcy treatise. I DAVID
G. Ei'sTrEIN, SrEVE H.

NICKLES

&

JAMES J. WrITE, BANKRUPTCY

§ 6-45 (1992)

[1 know

that is a sentence fragment: my I Ith grade English teacher, Alice Lindemann (bless her
soul) said that I could use sentence fragments after I had a book published. DE].
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term "recoupment" for almost seventy years. 4
The facts and recoupment issues in the most recent United States
Court of Appeals decision on recoupment in bankruptcy, In re Holyoke
Nursing Home, Inc.,5 are representative. 6 The Chapter 11 debtor, Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc. ("H") operated a nursing home and was a party
to a Medicare Provider Agreement with the United States Health Care
Financing Administration ("US"). 7 Under the agreement, US made advance payments to H based on estimates of costs of services that H provided to Medicare patients, subject to an audit at the end of each fiscal
year. 8 If the audit showed that H was paid more than the amount to
which it was entitled, then US was authorized by statute to withhold the
amount of prior overpayment from subsequent payments or make other
arrangements to obtain repayment from H. 9
In the fiscal year 2000, US determined that it had overpaid H in prior
fiscal years and deducted the overpayment from its payments to H during
that year. The fiscal year 2000 was also the year that H filed for Chapter
11.10 H filed an adversary proceeding against US contending that the
deductions within four months before H's bankruptcy filing were voidable preferential transfers and that US's deductions after the bankruptcy
filing were in violation of the automatic stay." The bankruptcy judge, 12
the district court judge, and a unanimous appellate court panel1 3 looked
to the law of recoupment to hold that US's reduction of payments was
neither a preferential transfer nor a violation of the automatic stay. 14
A short article discussing, inter alia, the First Circuit's opinion in In re
Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc. concludes, "[o]ld issues continue to arise
4. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1937) is the first reported opinion in a bankruptcy case that we found that mentions "recoupment."
5. 372 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2004).
6. Looking at reported decisions in bankruptcy cases, it is clear that Medicare overpayment is the most frequently litigated recoupment fact pattern. It should, however, be
just as clear that recoupment litigation is not limited to Medicare repayments. See, e.g., In
re B&L Oil Co., 782 F.2d 155, 158-59 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that oil buyer could withhold payment for post-petition deliveries to recoup pre-petition overpayments);
Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 B.R. 309, 313-14 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (holding that recording
company could recoup pre-petition royalty advances to musician from post-petition record

sales).
7.
8.
9.
10.

In re Holyoke Nursing Home, 372 F.3d at 2.
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (2000).
In re Holyoke Nursing Home, 372 F.3d at 3.
It. Id.
12. In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 273 B.R. 305, 312 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
13. The First Circuit's opinion was authored by Judge Conrad Cyr who "came to the
Court of Appeals after serving with great distinction as a United States Bankruptcy Court
judge in Bangor for twenty years," 13 Investiture Speech of Kermit v. Lopez, in ME.. B.J.
238, 240 (1998). See also Gerald K. Smith, Issues in Partnershipand Partner Bankruptcy
Cases and Reorganization of PartnershipDebtors, 86 ALI-ABA CON rINUINci LIEGAI EoUCATION, 639, 679 (1996) ("Judge Cyr, one of the most knowledgeable Circuit Court judges
as far as bankruptcy matters.").
14. In re Holyoke Nursing Home, 372 F.3d at 4.
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.... ,,15 To understand these "old issues," we need
to (1) understand the non-bankruptcy law origins of the doctrine of recoupment and the non-bankruptcy law differences between recoupment
and setoff, (2) remember the language of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and the bankruptcy law differences between
recoupment and setoff, (3) review the reported opinions that distinguish
recoupment in bankruptcy from non-bankruptcy recoupment, and (4)
consider the role of transfer of property of the estate in preference law,
the role of "equity" in bankruptcy and the role of state law in applying
recoupment in bankruptcy.

and be misunderstood.

I.

THE NON-BANKRUPTCY LAW OF
RECOUPMENT AND SETOFF
A.

EQUITY ORIGINS

The origins of recoupment are in equity and in common law pleading.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated in In
re B & L Co.,t 6 "Recoupment originated as an equitable rule of joinder.
It allowed adjudication in one suit of two claims that otherwise had to be
17
brought separately under the common-law forms of action."'
In his commentaries on equity jurisprudence, Justice/Professor Story,
provides the following description of recoupment:
The doctrine of recoupment rests upon the principle that it is just
and equitable to settle in one action ... all claims arising out of the
same contract or transaction.... It is an innovation upon the strict
rules of the common law, sanctioned by the courts for the purpose of
doing equity between the parties. 8
Even more modern descriptions of recoupment continue to refer to it as
an "equitable doctrine." 1 9
Most modern descriptions of recoupment have changed "same contract
or transaction" to "same transaction." For example, in National Cash
Register Co. v. Joseph,2 0 the New York Court of Appeals stated:
15. Samuel R. Maizel, An Issue That Just Won't Go Away, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34,
45 (2004). According to Mr. Maizel's firm's website:

Mr. Maizel specializes in bankruptcy matters, and related appeals, with an
emphasis on health-care and government-contract insolvency issues. His clients include the attorneys general of forty-six states and six territories that
are parties to the master settlement agreement with the tobacco industry.
Formerly, he represented the federal government in bankruptcy, district, and
appellate courts nationwide. He has lectured extensively and been interviewed on television and radio on numerous bankruptcy topics.
See http://www.pszyjw.com/attorney-profile-30.htmltopics.

16. 782 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1986).
17. Id. at 157.
18.

3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1878 at 479-80

(14th ed. 1918).
19. See, e.g., TIFD

III-X LLC v. Freuhauf Prod. Co., L.L.C., No. Civ. A. 20488-NC,
2004 WL 1517135, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2004); In re Watson, 778 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004).

20. 86 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 1949).
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"Recoupment" means a deduction from a money claim through a
process whereby cross demands arising out of the same transaction
are allowed to compensate one another and the balance only to be
recovered. Of course, such a process does not allow one transaction
to be offset against another, but only permits a transaction which is
made the subject of suit by a plaintiff to be examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the
one transaction as a whole. 21
This excerpt from National Cash Register not only explains what recoupment is but also points out what recoupment is not: "such a process
[i.e., recoupment] does not allow one transaction to be offset against another ....-22 There is another process-setoff-which allows one transaction to be offset against another transaction.

B.

RECOUPMENT

AND SETOFF

The United States Supreme Court provided the following example and
explanation of setoff: "The right of setoff (also called 'offset') allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each
other, thereby avoiding 'the absurdity of making A pay B, when B owes
A." 23 Historically, the most common use of setoff has been by banks
against borrowers who are also depositors. For example, D deposits 100
in C Bank. D later borrows 60 from C Bank. Still later, D defaults on the
loan. By the exercise of its right of setoff, C Bank can reduce D's loan
balance to 60 and D's bank account balance to 0.24
In a setoff, the mutual debts arise from different transactions and the
right of setoff typically arises by reason of statute. In recoupment, both
debts must arise out of a single integrated transaction so that it would be
inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of the transaction without
also meeting its obligations.
Obviously, setoff and recoupment are very similar remedies for the collection of debts outside of bankruptcy. It is not usual for non-bankruptcy
courts to recognize that a creditor has right to setoff or recoupment without distinguishing between the two.
21. Id. at 562 (citations omitted).
22. Id.
23. Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (quoting Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 529 (1913)). Strumpf of course dealt with the difference

between a right of setoff and an "administrative hold." Id. at 17. The Court never mentions "recoupment." Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 259 (1993), is the only Supreme Court

decision involving bankruptcy that mentions recoupment. We will more than mention Reiter later in this article. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
24. Changes in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code will probably reduce the
importance of setoffs by banks. Banks now can and do obtain security interests in their
depositors' bank accounts. See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 16 (2000); see generally Stuart D. Albea, Security Interests in Deposit Accounts and the Banking Industry's Use of Setoff, 54
ALA. L. REV. 147 (2002); Ingrid M. Hillinger, David L. Batty & Richard K. Brown, Deposit
Accounts Under the New World Order, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 1 (2002).
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Statute of Limitations Cases

There is, however, a substantial body of case law outside of bankruptcy
that distinguishes between setoff and recoupment. A line of statute of
limitations cases holds that a claim of recoupment is not barred by its own
statute of limitations while a setoff claim arising from a different transac25
tion is time-barred.
Cooper v. Reaves,26 is illustrative. Cooper filed a medical malpractice
suit against Reaves and later voluntarily dismissed the suit. 27 Just before
the running of the relevant statute of limitations, Reaves sued Cooper,
alleging malicious prosecution and claiming that money was due him by
her on open account. 2- In response, Cooper filed a counterclaim alleging
that Reaves breached an implied covenant to treat her in a fair and reasonable manner. 29 Reaves contended that the counterclaim was barred
by the statute of limitations. 30 The Alabama Supreme Court distinguished setoff from recoupment to hold for Cooper: "Here Cooper's
counterclaim for 'breach of contract' clearly arises out of the same transaction as Reaves' claim on open account, since the contract allegedly
breached by Reaves is the same contract Reaves claims Cooper has not
paid. Consequently, the counterclaim was not barred by the statute of
'3t
limitations."
25. See, e.g., Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935) (allowing an executor to
offset the government's claim for an income tax deficiency with a claim for overpayment of
estate tax based on the same transaction despite the fact that the limitations period for an
action for refund on the estate tax had run, unless the offset was permitted the taxpayer
would have been taxed twice on the same transaction based on inconsistent characterizations of the transaction); see also In re Gober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1996);
Cooper v. Reaves, 365 So. 2d 670, 671 (Ala. 1978); see generally Camilia E. Watson, Equitable Recoupment: Revisiting an Old and Inconsistent Remedy, 65 FORD!LAM L. REV. 691

(1996) (notwithstanding the broad title, Professor Watson revisits only federal tax litigation); Michael E. Chaplin, Note, Reviving ContractClaims Barred By the Statute of Limitations: An Examination of the Legal and Ethical Foundationfor Revival, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1571 (2000). We particularly like Mr. Chaplin's moral basis for courts treating re-

coupment different from setoff in applying statutes of limitation:
It seems, almost intuitively, that people ascribe greater weight to some actions than to others. Call it a mental moral ledger. For some reason we distinguish between one action that calls for a response (like a thank you card for a
gift) from another that does not (as when we find loose change hidden in the
crevices of an old sofa). We feel morally obligated in the first instance to
make an appropriate response; however, the second instance-while creating
a certain amount of pleasure-does not compel us to act. Similarly, set-offbecause it is based on a separate action-is more like the loose change scenario. We would not say that because I found the change, you have a right to
part of it just because you lost your watch. In like manner, recoupment is
more like the thank you card for the gift. Because the actions flow from the
same basic "good," we are more comfortable with importing a moral obligation to that situation.
Id. at 1590-91.
26. 365 So. 2d 670 (Ala. 1978).
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

31.

Id. at 671.
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Sovereign Immunity Cases

There is also a line of sovereign immunity cases relying on the distinction between setoff and recoupment. These cases hold that when a sovereign sues, it waives its immunity as to recoupment claims of the
defendant-claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrencebut the sovereign does not waive immunity as to claims which do not
meet recoupment's same transaction or occurrence test. 32
For example, Frederick v. United States,33 the most cited sovereign immunity recoupment case, involved a suit by the Small Business Association to recover on a guaranty. The defendant was allowed to raise as a
counterclaim the government's mishandling of the defendant's security
interest. 34 In so ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit said:
The distinction between recoupment and set-off has significance
where a defendant sued by the United States asserts a claim as to
which the government has made no statutory waiver of its sovereign
immunity. .

.

. Our conclusion is that when the sovereign sues it

waives immunity as to claims of the defendant which assert matters
in recoupment-arising out of the same transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the government's suit, and to the extent of defeating the government's claim but not to the extent of a
judgment against the government which is affirmative in the sense of
involving relief different in kind or nature to that sought by the government or in the sense of exceeding the amount of the government's claims; but the sovereign does not waive immunity as to
claims which do not meet the "same transaction or occurrence test"
nor to claims of a different form or nature than that sought by it as
plaintiff nor to claims exceeding in amount than that sought by it as
35
plaintiff.
3.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13

In so ruling, both the Cooper and Frederick courts looked to the body
of law on compulsory and permissive counterclaims now embodied in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13.36 There is a significant body of case
32. E.g., FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1486-87 (10th Cir. 1994); Frederick v. United
States 386 F.2d 481, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1967); contra United States v. Iron Mountain Mines,
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432 , 1455-56 (E.D. Cal. 1992). The Iron Mountain Mines opinion ac-

knowledges that other circuits have followed Frederickand concedes that "[w~hen the sovereign sues it waives immunity as to claims of the defendant which assert matters in
recoupment-and arising out of the same transaction or occurrence which is the subject
matter of the government's suit, and to the extent of defeating the government's claim .... "
Id. at 1455. While critical of the Frederick opinion-"the foundation of Frederick is shaky

at best"-the Iron Mountain Mines opinion simply declines to apply recoupment doctrine
to a government cost recovery action under CERCLA. Id.
33. 386 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1967).
34. Id. at 484.

35. Id. at 487-88 (citations omitted).
36. Cooper, 365 So. 2d at 671; Frederick, 386 F.2d at 488.
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law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1337 on recoupment and setoff
discussing the "arising out of the same transaction" requirement that is a
part of both the common law of recoupment and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 13 (hereinafter "Rule 13").38
Rule 13 originated from the law of recoupment. In dictum, in Coplay
Cement Co., Inc. v. Willis & Paul Group,39 Judge Posner writes:
Even before the term "counterclaim" was given currency by the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, a defendant could seek to reduce its liability by pleading that the plaintiff
owed it money. The plea was called "recoupment" if the plaintiff's
debt to the defendant arose out of the same transaction as the defenSo recoupdant's liability to the plaintiff, and "setoff" if it did not.
40
ment is the ancestor of the compulsory counterclaim.
Similar statements by way of dicta can be found4 in other reported cases
and in the major treatises on the Federal Rules. 1
The above quotation regarding recoupment from Coplay is dictum because the case involves "an esoteric Indiana statute governing the relations between owners and subcontractors" 42 and raises "fundamental
issues . . . concerning the doctrine of setoff." 43 Perhaps the most interesting dictum in Coplay addresses setoff directly:
Although as a procedural device the setoff has been supplanted by
the permissive counterclaim, the term is sometimes used in a substantive or remedial sense that is very near to the lay sense of the
word, to mean an offset to liability, a netting out of opposing claims.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
38. Compare the common law test for recoupment-"same transaction"--and the
Rule 13 test for compulsory counterclaims-"same transaction or occurrence." The latter
would seem broader. "Occurrence" would seem to be something additional to
"transaction."
In the main, the case law under Rule 13 does not distinguish between a "transaction"
and an "occurrence." The leading treatise on the Federal Rules concludes "Most courts,
rather than attempting to define the key terms of Rule 13(a) precisely, have preferred to
suggest standards by which the compulsory or permissive nature of specific counterclaims
can be determined." 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGI-r', ARTH-UR R. MILLER & MARY KAY
KANE, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1410

(2d ed. 1990).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit uses one term to define the
other: "Transaction" within the purview of the compulsory counterclaim rule "may comprehend a series of many occurrences." Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 552 F.2d
1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926)
("'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences ....
). Moore pre-dates Rule 13; it was decided under Equity Rule 30 which contained a "same transaction" test, not a same transaction or occurrence test. Id. at 609.
And, in the main, the case law under recoupment looks to Rule 13 cases without discussing whether the cases were "same transaction" cases or "same occurrence" cases. E.g.,
FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1486-87 (10th Cir. 1994); Frederick, 386 F.2d at 487-88.
39. 983 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1993).
40. Id. at 1440.
41. See, e.g., Berger v. City of North Miami, 820 F. Supp. 989, 992 (E.D. Va. 1993); 6
CIIAR! Es ALAN WRI;Hr, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACI-ICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1401 (2d ed. 1990).
42. Coplay, 983 F.2d at 1435.
43. Id.
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• . . Setoff survives as a distinctive doctrine-something different

from a permissive counterclaim, on the one hand, or a name for the
netting of opposing claims, on the other hand-only in banking and
in bankruptcy. In the banking industry, setoff denotes a security interest that the law recognizes by allowing the bank to deduct the
depositor's debt to it before other creditors can reach the account.
And the Bankruptcy Code contains a complex provision regulating
the rights of debtors of a bankrupt to set off the debts of the bankrupt to them. 44 Although the doctrine of setoff has an equitable lineage-it dates back to the seventeenth-century chancery court's
jurisdiction over bankruptcy-it was grafted onto the common law
by statute in the eighteenth century. By the time it turned into the
permissive counterclaim, it had lost all of its equitable foliage. Only
in banking and in bankruptcy, the two contexts in which as we said
setoff retains its substantive or remedial distinction, do equitable
considerations sometimes surface .... 45
This statement about setoff raises two significant recoupment questions. First, if setoff has been supplanted by the permissive counterclaim
only as a "procedural device," has recoupment been supplanted by the
compulsory counterclaim only as a "procedural device?" In other words,
is there a body of recoupment law independent of Rule 13? Second, if
setoff is a "distinctive doctrine in bankruptcy," is recoupment also a "distinctive doctrine in bankruptcy?"
In Berger v. City of North Miami,46 a statute of limitations case like
Cooper, a federal district court for the Eastern District of Virginia provides answers to the first question:
[Ilt is apparent that there is a marked resemblance between the recoupment doctrine and compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a),
Fed. R. Civ P. Nor is this accidental; recoupment is the common law
precursor to the modern compulsory counterclaim. Yet, the recoupment doctrine is more than a precursor; it has survived the codification of compulsory counterclaims and enjoys continuing vitality
today as a means of asserting an otherwise time-barred
counterclaim. 47
This first excerpt from the district court opinion in Berger arguably supports the proposition that there is a body of recoupment law independent
of Rule 13.
The district court opinion in Berger then proceeds to look to Rule 13
case law in determining whether recoupment was appropriate-whether
state law contract claims arise from the "same transaction" that formed
the basis for North Miami's CERCLA counterclaim:
Instructive in this regard is the test employed in the Rule 13(a), Fed.
R. Civ. P., context to ascertain whether a counterclaim is compul44. See II U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 553.
45. Id. at 1440-41 (citations omitted).
46. 820 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Va. 1993).

47.

Id. at 992.
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sory, i.e., whether it arises from the "same transaction or occurrence" as the main claim. Indeed, given the relationship and
essential similarity between compulsory counterclaims and recoupment claims, there is no reason to refrain from using the Rule 13(a)
standard to test whether a claim meets the first leg of the recoupment test. In addition, use of this standard is consistent with policy
considerations relating to the just and expeditious resolution of
CERCLA cases. This standard ensures that collateral matters are not
joined with the CERCLA action so as to result in unwarranted expense and delay in resolution of the CERCLA claim. Under the
Rule 13(a) standard, the following factors must be examined: (i)
whether issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim
are largely the same; (ii) whether substantially the same evidence
bears on both claims; and (iii) whether any logical relationship exists
between the two claims. Application of this standard to the contract
claims asserted here compels the conclusion that they do not arise
counterclaim. As such,
from the same transaction as North Miami's
48
they are not valid recoupment claims.
This second excerpt from the Berger opinion arguably supports the
proposition that not only did Rule 13(a) originate from the law of recoupment but that the law of recoupment has, at least in part, evolved into the
law of Rule 13(a). And similar statements can be found in other reported
opinions, including opinions arising in bankruptcy cases. Before we take a
look at those bankruptcy cases, let's review the non-bankruptcy law of
recoupment and overview the bankruptcy law of recoupment.
In review, there is a substantial body of non-bankruptcy law of recoupment. While many of the recoupment cases arose before Rule 13, many of
the cases since the promulgation of Rule 13(a) refer to, if not rely on,
cases arising under Rule 13. And, it is a substantial body of law that consistently applies a "same transaction" test (even though the application of
that test from case to case may or may not be entirely consistent).
II.

BANKRUPTCY STATUTES AND SETOFF
AND RECOUPMENT

A.
1.

SETOFF AND RECOUPMENT UNDER BANKRUPTCY ACT OF

1898

Language of Act

Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was entitled "Set-Offs and
Counterclaims" and recognized the right of setoff: "In all cases of mutual
debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor
the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other,
48. Id. at 992-93 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ownbey Enter., Inc., 780
F. Supp. 817, 820 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (equating recoupment claim to compulsory counterclaim); United States v. Isenberg, 110 F.R.D. 387, 391 (D. Conn. 1986) (applying Rule
13(a) test in determining whether recoupment counterclaim arose from -same transaction"
as main claim).
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and the balance only shall be allowed or paid."'4 9
Note that the language of section 68 does not include the word "recoupment. ' 50 There is no section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that
'5
includes the word "recoupment." '
Note also that the language of section 68 includes the verb "shall. '52
Notwithstanding Congress's use of the mandatory "shall" rather than the
permissive "may," "it has been stated frequently that the privilege of setoff under section 68a is permissive and not mandatory, and that the application when invoked, before a court rests in the discretion of, that court,
which exercises such discretion under the general principles of equity. '5 3
2.

Case Law Applying the Language of Section 68 of Bankruptcy Act
of 1898

One of the cases that so states, Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan,54 is
the first United States Court of Appeals decision under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 that mentions "recoupment." Stanolind Oil involved leases
belonging to an oil company, Virginia Oil & Refining Company ("VOR")
that was adjudicated bankrupt in an involuntary case in 1923. 5 5 In his

final accounting, the trustee reported "that there were a great many
leases in the assets of said estate, which were all wild cat, and which your
trustee, using his best efforts, endeavored to sell but was absolutely unable to do so, and, although he still holds same, they are, in his opinion
worthless. '56 The estate was closed; VOR did not receive a discharge. 57
In 1930, three things happened: (1) oil was discovered in that part of
East Texas, (2) one of VOR's creditors sued in state court and had a
receiver appointed, and (3) the state court receiver sold VOR leases to
Simms Oil Company ("SOC"). Thereafter VOR's bankruptcy was reopened and the bankruptcy trustee sued SOC to recover the leases. 58
SOC argued that the leases had been abandoned. In the alternative,
SOC argued "for reimbursement of expenses . ..in the lease."'5 9 The

district court ruled adversely to SOC on both arguments. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed as to abandonment
but reversed "[i]n so far as the judgment appealed from denies appellants
49. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 68, 30 Stat. 544, 565, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326.
50. See generally id.
51. See generally id.
52. See generally id.
53. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $1 68.02, at 851-52 (14th ed. 1978) (citing to cases
which cite to the Collier treatise). A similar statement can be found in HENRY Bi.ACK,
HANDBOOK ON lE LAW OF BANKRUPTrcY 380 (1914) ("This provision of the Bankruptcy
Act is regarded as permissive, rather than mandatory."); see also Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.
v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1937).
54. 92 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1937).
55. Id. at 29-30.
56. Id. at 30.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 29.

59. Id.
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a recovery by way of set-off for the amount expended for development
and operation of the lease .... -60 Before so ruling, the appellate court
said the following about section 68, set-off and recoupment: "The doctrine of set-off and recoupment is recognized by the National Bankruptcy
Act, Section 68. The provisions of section 68 are permissive rather than
mandatory .... "61

Like our former President, focus on the word

''

"is. 62

Note that the

language of the Bankruptcy Act is not "doctrines of set-off and recoupment are" but "doctrine of set-off and recoupment is." Grammatically,
the Fifth Circuit in Stanolind Oil is treating set-off and recoupment as a
single doctrine. Legally, courts, including the Fifth Circuit,63generally treat
set-off (or setoff) and recoupment as separate doctrines.
And, note also in the first excerpt from the Stanolind Oil opinion, the
ruling as to SOC's "recovery by way of set-off." While Stanolind Oil is
the first circuit court opinion under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to65mention "recoupment," 64 it is a set-off case, not a "recoupment" case.
In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 66 the next circuit court opinion
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that mentions "recoupment" does not
mention Stanolind Oil. It does mention section 68 and states by way of
dictum:
"[R]ecoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some
feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is
grounded." The rule of recoupment in bankruptcy derives from the
rule that the trustee takes the bankrupt's property subject to the equities therein. It does not attach by reason of the set-off provisions of
Sec. 68.67

While the Monongahela Rye Liquors dictum on whether Bankruptcy
Act section 68 covers both set-off and recoupment is different from the
dictum in Stanolind Oil, both cases are set-off cases, not recoupment
68
cases.
60. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Cf BOB BARR, THE MEANING OF -Is": THE SQUANDERED
WASTED LEGACY OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON (2004).

IMPEACH-MENT ANI)

63. E.g., In re United States Abatement Corp., 79 F.3d 393, 398 n.16 (5th Cir. 1996)
("The doctrine of recoupment is similar to but distinct from the legal and equitable principle of 'setoff'!"); State ex rel. Key W. Retaining Sys., Inc. v.Holm II, Inc., 59 P.3d 1280,
1291 (Or. App. 2002) ("'Recoupment,' 'setoff' and 'counterclaim' are not synonymous
terms."). A district court in Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 B.R. 309, 314 n.3 (M.D. Tenn.
1981), describes Stanolind Oil as "simply incorrect" and adds "a distinction between recoupment and set-off has been universally recognized. To equate them, as the Fifth Circuit
seems to have done and as the trustee would have this Court do, would fly in the face of
both established authority and common logic."
64. Stanolind Oil, 92 F.2d at 32.
65. SOC's claim for reimbursement of improvement expenses did not arise from the
same transaction as the trustee's claim for the return of the leases.
66. 141 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1944).
67. Id. at 869 (quoting Bull v. United States, 795 U.S. 247, 262 (1935)).
68. Id.
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The other circuit court opinion under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that
mentions both "recoupment" and section 68, Quittner v. Los Angeles
Steel Casting Co.,6 9 does not mention either Stanolind Oil or Monongahela Rye Liquors. And, the mention of "recoupment" and section 68
again is dictum and occurs in a footnote:
Where the matter is one of recoupment or defense, a defendant need
not rely upon § 68(a), because he would merely be proving that he is
not liable in full for the plaintiffs claim. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy,
§ 68.03, p. 714 (14th ed. 1942); 4 Remington on Bankruptcy, § 1435,
p. 160 (5th ed. 1943).70
There is a district court opinion, Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 71 that covers the question of whether Bankruptcy Act section 68 covers recoupment at greater length as an integral part of holding that CBS was able to
recoup money advanced to the great 72 George Jones before his bankruptcy from royalties that CBS owed to George Jones from post-bankruptcy sales:
The trustee attempts to argue that CBS must proceed with its
claim under the restrictive set-off provisions of section 68 of the
Bankruptcy Act, instead of possessing a general right of recoupment.
...

The trustee is sorely mistaken on both points.... [T]he recoup-

ment process is different from the requirements for set-off. While
set-off under section 68 is limited to instances involving mutuality of
obligation, recoupment is subject to no such limitation. The only real
requirement regarding recoupment is . . . arising out of the same
73

transaction as the original sum.
In sum, only three circuit court opinions under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 addressed the question of whether section 68a of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, which mentioned only setoff, also covered recoupment. Two
of the three circuits, and as indicated above, the two major bankruptcy
treatises 74 concluded that the word "set-off" as used in section 68a did
not include "recoupment."
B.

RECOUPMENT AND SETOFF UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE OF

1978

1. Language of the Code
Unlike the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 uses
the term "setoff' instead of "set-off. ' 75 And, unlike the Bankruptcy Act
69. 202 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1953).
70. Id. at 816 n.3.
71. 14 B.R. 309 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
72. It just doesn't get any better than "He Stopped Loving Her Today," lyrics available
at http://www.breakup-songs.com/georgejones.html.
73. Waldschmidt, 14 B.R. at 313-14.
74. See also 2 DANIEl COWENS. BANKRUm'CY LAW AND PRACTICE 121-122 (2d ed.
1978) (•Recoupment dealing with diminishment of a claim due to something arising out of
the same transaction is not dealt with as such by section 68.").
75. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (2000).
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of 1898, the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 uses the term "setoff' in more than
one section. 76 Most importantly, section 553 recognizes the right of setoff. 77 If a right of setoff exists under non-bankruptcy law, then section
553 generally validates the non-bankruptcy right of setoff in bankruptcy
and protects it from invalidation or avoidance under other sections of the
Bankruptcy Code. 78 Additionally, section 362(a)(7) stays the setoff of a
prepetition debt owing to the debtor against any claim against the
79
debtor.
Like the old Bankruptcy Act, the present Bankruptcy Code does not
use the word "recoupment." Accordingly, the question of whether the
statutory term "setoff" includes "recoupment" is of continuing practical
significance.
2.

Legislative History

There is no mention of "recoupment" in the legislative history for section 553. The report, which accompanied the bill which became the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, simply states, "This section preserves, with some
changes, the right of setoff in bankruptcy cases now found in section 68 of
the Bankruptcy Act." 80
3.

Cases Applying the Language of Sections 553 and 362(a)(7)

While legislative history is not helpful in answering the question
whether the word "setoff' in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 includes "recoupment," case law is. Reported opinions consistently state and hold
that the word "setoff" in sections 553 and 362(a)(7) does not include recoupment. The following statement from In re Malinowski,8I a 1998 Second Circuit opinion is representative:
The distinction between set-off and recoupment is crucial because
set-off claims are subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 and
are substantively limited by the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 553
(1994). Recoupment, in contrast, comes into bankruptcy law through
the common law, rather than by statute, and is not subject to the
limitations of section 553 or the automatic stay. The automatic stay
funds subject to recoupment are not the
is inapplicable, because
82
debtor's property.
Similar statements as to the differences in Bankruptcy Code treatment
83
of setoff and recoupment can be found in opinions from the First,
76. See, e.g., IIU.S.C. §§ 362(b), 365(1)(2), 546(h), 553.
77.

11 U.S.C. § 553.

78. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7).
80. H. R. RE+P. No. 95-595, at 345 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6333.
81. 156 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1998).
82. Id. at 133 (citations omitted).
83. See United Structures of Am., Inc. v. G.R.G. Eng'g S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 998 (1st Cir.
1993).
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Third,84 Fifth, 85 Eighth, Ninth,8 6 and Tenth8 7 Circuits, and opinions from
88
district courts or bankruptcy courts in other circuits.
III. DISTINGUISHING RECOUPMENT IN
BANKRUPTCY FROM RECOUPMENT IN
NON-BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION
It is not the statements from the Malinowski opinion and opinions from
other circuits about the differences in the Bankruptcy Code's treatment
of setoff and recoupment that are problematic. Rather, it is statements in
the Malinowski opinion and some opinions from other circuits about the
differences in recoupment in bankruptcy and outside of bankruptcy that
need to be examined-statements such as:
The definition of "transaction" has been developed in the context of
determining whether counterclaims are compulsory or permissive
under the rules of civil procedure. In this context a transaction "may
comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much
upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship." However, in recoupment in bankruptcy, the term
"transaction" is given a more restricted definition. See McMahon,
129 F.3d at 97 ("In light of the Bankruptcy Code's strong policy
favoring equal treatment of creditors and bankruptcy court supervision over even secured creditors, the recoupment doctrine is a limited one and should be narrowly construed."). 89
In the portion of the Malinowski opinion set out above, the Second
Circuit seems to provide two reasons for a more restricted definition of
recoupment in bankruptcy than in non-bankruptcy litigation: (1) the impact of Rule 13 on the non-bankruptcy law of recoupment and (2) the
impact of bankruptcy policy of equal treatment of creditors on the bankruptcy law of recoupment.
A.

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

13

AND

RECOUPMENT IN BANKRUPTCY

The use of Rule 13 and the use of recoupment in bankruptcy both turn
on a "same transaction" test. The Second Circuit in Malinowski properly
questions whether "same transaction" should mean the same thing in
both contexts. 90
84. See Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984).
85. See In re McConnell, 934 F.2d 662, 667 (5th Cir. 1991).
86. See In re Newbery Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir.
1996).
87. See In re Peterson Distrib., Inc., 82 F.3d 956, 959-60 (10th Cir. 1996).
88. See, e.g., In re Nu-Kote Holding, Inc., 257 B.R. 855, 864-65 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
2001); In re Graves, 234 B.R. 149, 150 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999); In re Pearson Indus., Inc.,
142 B.R. 831, 849 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992).
89. Malinowski, 156 F.3d at 133 (citations omitted).
90. Id.
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In summarizing the Rule 13 case law on "same transaction," the leading treatise on federal practice and procedure concludes: "Courts generally have agreed that these words should be interpreted liberally in order
to further the general policies of the federal rules and carry out the philosophy of Rule 13(a).'
A court in a bankruptcy case is not charged with advancing the "general policies of the federal rules" and carrying out the "philosophy of
Rule 13." Unless it is applying Rule 13.92
93
As the Supreme Court noted in a footnote in Reiter v. Cooper:
For purposes of applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing counterclaims, it does not matter that this action arose in
bankruptcy. Rules 8 and 54 are made fully applicable in adversary
proceedings by Bankruptcy Rules 7008 and 7054, and Rule 13 is
minor variation (not relevant here) by
made applicable with only
94
Bankruptcy Rule 7013.
This Supreme Court dictum in Reiter v. Cooper does not however
mean that "same transaction" has the same meaning in recoupment litigation arising under Bankruptcy Code section 362(a)(7) or section 553
95
that it has in litigation under Bankruptcy Rule 7013 or Federal Rule 13.
To the extent that reported cases on "same transaction" in applying Rule
13 reflect the "general policies of the federal rules" or carrying out the
"philosophy of Rule 13" those cases may not be helpful in determining
''same transaction" in applying the Bankruptcy Code which has different
"general policies." '96
91. 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRAC-TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1410 (2d ed. 1990). Like the Collier treatise, Wright, Miller
& Kane cite cases that cite the treatise to support the treatise.
92. Another one of those sentence fragments. Again, do not blame this on co-author
Nockels or the law review editor. Again, Ms. Lindemann is responsible. See supra note 2.
93. 507 U.S. 258 (1993).
94. Id. at 265 n.2. But cf Craig H. Averch & Blake L. Berryman, Getting Out of the
Code: When Equitable Remedies Obtain Priority Over General Unsecured Claims, 5 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 285, 300 (1996) ("Bankruptcy Rule 7013, which generally incorporates
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13's treatment of counterclaims, makes an exception for a
nondebtor's claim that arose on or before entry of the order for relief. Such a claim is not
a compulsory counterclaim, even if it arose from the same transaction as the estate's claim
against the nondebtor. Accordingly, Bankruptcy Rule 7013 makes clear that prepetition
claims should not be afforded special treatment merely because such claims would be characterized, outside of bankruptcy, as compulsory counterclaims. The Supreme Court did
not discuss this point.").
95. But cf Peter R. Roest, Recovery of Medicare and Medicaid Overpanyments in Bankruptcy, 10 ANNALs HEALTH L. 1,46 (2001) ("[T]he Court [in Reiter] found no difference
between the right of recoupment in bankruptcy and the ability to assert a compulsory
counterclaim in district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.")
In the brief for the appellant in Dewey Freight, this quotation from Reiter is used to
support the proposition that "the Court found no difference between the right of recoupment in bankruptcy and the ability of any defendant to assert a compulsory counterclaim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 in any district court." Brief for Appellant at 28.
The Eighth Circuit opinion did not even use a footnote to address this argument. See
United States v. Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1994).
96. Without quoting from or even discussing Reiter, the Third Circuit concluded:
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IMPACT OF BANKRUPTCY PoLicY FAVORING EQUAL
TREATMENT OF CREDITORS

There is a bankruptcy policy that can be "inelegantly" described as
favoring equal treatment of creditors. We will describe that policy more
elegantly in the next part of the paper.
Recall from the language of the Malinowski opinion that the Second
Circuit looks to the bankruptcy policy favoring equal treatment of creditors in calling for a "more restrictive" definition of "same transaction,"
i.e., a more restrictive concept of recoupment in bankruptcy cases than in
other cases. 9 7 Similar language can be found in other reported decisions
from circuit courts and lower courts.
Consider for example, In re Peterson Distributing, Inc.,98 a Tenth Circuit case involving the bankruptcy of a gas distributor ("Debtor") with a
Jobber Franchise Agreement with Conoco. Conoco agreed to (1) sell
products to the Debtor on credit; and (2) accept credit card invoices from
the Debtor and pay the Debtor the face amounts of the invoices, less a
three percent processing fee. 99 At the time the Debtor filed its Chapter
11 petition, it owed Conoco more than $245,000 for Conoco products purchased on credit from Conoco; Conoco in turn owed the Debtor almost
$23,000 for prepetition credit card receipts. After bankruptcy, Debtor
generated an additional $46,561 of credit card receipts. 10 0
In an adversary proceeding, Conoco asserted a right to setoff or recoup
both the prepetition and post-petition credit card receipts-$69,370against its claim of $245,159. The bankruptcy court held that recoupment
We find that the open-ended standard, endorsed in the context of discerning
compulsory counterclaims, is inadequate for determining whether two claims
arise from the same transaction for the purposes of equitable recoupment in
bankruptcy. Indeed, in Lee we stressed that both setoff and recoupment play
very different roles in bankruptcy than in their original roles as rules of
pleading.
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1081 (3d Cir. 1992).
In In re TLC Hosp., Inc., 224 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit quotes
from the Univ. Med. Cr.opinion but does "not accept the Third Circuit's narrow definition
of 'transaction."' Instead, the Ninth Circuit looks to the "logical relationship" test adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610
(1926). Id.at 1012.
Moore is an antitrust case that has no direct application to recoupment in bankruptcy.
Moore (the case) does, however, have a direct relationship to Rule 13. MoozF, (the treatise) explains that, in applying Rule 13's "same transaction" test, "the federal courts have
constructed analyses using as their foundation the logical relationship test as developed by
the Supreme Court." 3 JAMES WM MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 13.01[il][b]
(2004).

In sum, the Ninth Circuit uses the Rule 13 test for "same transaction" in determining
whether there is a right of recoupment in bankruptcy cases.
And, other circuit courts have looked to the Rule 13 test for "same transaction" in determining whether there is "same transaction" as the phrase is used in section 106(b). E.g., In
re Gordon Sel-Way, Inc., 270 F.3d 280, 287 (6th Cir. 2001); Burlington, N.R.R. v. Strong,
907 F.2d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 1990).
97. Malinowski, 156 F.3d at 133.

98. 82 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1996).
99. Id. at 958.
100. Id. at 958-59.
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did not apply and that Conoco was limited to setoff of the almost $23,000
of prepetition credit card receipts.' 0 ' The district court reversed, holding
that Conoco was entitled to recoup the entire $69,370 and the Tenth Circuit then ruled that the bankruptcy court was correct.' 0 2 In so ruling, the
Tenth Circuit focused on the "same transaction" requirement and the
bankruptcy policy of equal treatment of creditors: "Recoupment is 'narrowly construed' in bankruptcy cases because it violates the basic bankruptcy principle of equal distribution to creditors .... Therefore, for the
purposes of recoupment, 'same transaction' is a term of art that must be
03
narrowly defined."1
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Peterson Distributingnowhere mentions
the one Supreme Court opinion that mentions recoupment in bankruptcy,
Reiter v. Cooper .04 The "Cooper" in Reiter v. Cooper was a bankruptcy trustee for a trucking company suing a customer, Reiter, for
freight undercharges. Reiter counterclaimed that the tariff rates were unreasonable. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia described the question presented by the case as
...whether, when a shipper [Reiter] defends against a motor common carrier's [Cooper] suit to collect tariff rates with the claim that
the tariff rates were unreasonable, the court should proceed immediately to judgment on the carrier's complaint without waiting for the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to rule on the reasonableness issue.t5
While most of the opinion deals with the Interstate Commerce Act
(ICA), the Court also dealt with recoupment in bankruptcy. Under the
ICA, challenges to the reasonableness of tariff rates must be pursued
within two years after the claim accrues.10 6 Reiter had waited too long to
bring his own civil action. Recoupment claims, however, are not barred
by a statute of limitations as long as the main action is timely. 0 7 Accordingly, the facts of Reiter and the language of the Reiter opinion address
the issue of recoupment in a bankruptcy context.10 8
Additionally, Reiter mentions the bankruptcy policy of favoring equal
treatment of creditors, albeit somewhat obliquely in dictum in a footnote:
"Recoupment permits a determination of the 'just and proper liability on
the main issue' and involves 'no element of preference.' 4 Collier on
Bankruptcy para. 553.03, p. 553-17 (15th ed. 1991)."109
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Newbery Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Insur101. Id. at 958.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 959-60 (citations omitted).
104. 507 U.S. 258 (1993).

105. Id. at 260.
106. 49 U.S.C. § 14705(c) (2000).
107. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935).
108. Reiter, 507 U.S. at 258.

109. Id. at 265 n.2..
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ance Co., 110 is the only circuit court opinion that has expressly relied on
this language from Reiter. In Quittner v. Los Angeles Steel Casting Co.,
an earlier, pre-Reiter decision, the Ninth Circuit had denied recoupment
because "it would interfere with the ratable distribution of assets among
the general creditors." ''
While this language from the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Quittner is consistent with the language from the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Peterson
Distributing, the Ninth Circuit in Newbery ruled that it was "inconsistent" ' 12 with the language from the Supreme Court's opinion in Reiter that "the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected [this] portion of
Quittner." 13
Although most of the reported cases that have considered the impact
of the bankruptcy policy favoring equal treatment of creditors on applying recoupment's "same transaction" test in bankruptcy have, like Malinowski and Peterson Distributing, made no mention of the Supreme
Court decision in Reiter, we think that Reiter got it right. And here is
why.
IV.

A.

THE ROLE OF PREFERENCE LAW, EQUITY,
AND NON-BANKRUPTCY LAW

THE ROLE OF A "TRANSFER OF AN INTEREST OF A DEBTOR
IN PROPERTY" IN PREFERENCE LAW

According to the Supreme Court in Reiter, recoupment "involves no
element of preference." ' 1 4 Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code sets
out the elements of an avoidable preference, providing in part:
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt .... 115
Don't miss the first element of a preference which comes before any of
the numbered elements: "transfer of an interest of the debtor in property."' 1 6 Recognition of a creditor's right of recoupment involves neither
a "transfer" nor "an interest of the debtor in property."
110. 95 F.3d 1392, 1400 (9th Cir. 1996).
111. 202 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1953).
112. Newbery, 95 F.3d at 1400.

113. Id. at 1398.
114. Reiter, 597 U.S. at 265 n.2.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
116. The House Report, explaining the purpose of section 547, "missed" this unnumbered element of a preference: "[T]he preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that
received a greater payment than others of his class is required to disgorge so that all may
share equally." H. R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6138. '[he qualifying words "as a result of a transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property" should have been inserted after the word "payment" in the last sentence.
Assume, for example, that C is one of D's unsecured creditors. P, D's parent, pays C.
Neither D nor P pays any of D's other creditors. D then files for bankruptcy. It is at least
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"Transfer" is broadly defined in section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code as
"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property, including retention of title as a1 7security interest and foreclosure
of the debtor's equity of redemption."1
As a leading bankruptcy treatise puts more simply:
Put simply, "transfer" includes, for purposes of section 547(b), any
event that results in eliminating or diluting the debtor's interest in
property. . . .A transfer occurs whenever the debtor's interest in
property is diminished by ...action or by ...operation of law....
[T]he meaning of "transfer" is probably sufficiently broad to encompass setoff ....18
While we can understand that a treatise with a co-author then in the
"real world" practicing law might use a "weasel word"'' 19 like "probably,"
we are in the unreal world of law school and so substitute the law student's favorite word "clearly:" The meaning of "transfer" is clearly sufficiently broad to encompass a setoff. Consider again the most common
setoff situation: D has 1000 in an account at B Bank. D then borrows 600
from B Bank. D defaults. Notwithstanding the loan and the default, D
still has a complete and absolute property right in the 1000 in the bank
account. It is only when B Bank exercises its right of setoff that D's property right is reduced from 1000 to 400. D's "interest in property is diminished by . . .operation of law."'1 20 Setoff is thus within the Bankruptcy
Code's meaning of "transfer."
This meaning of "transfer" is not, however, sufficiently broad to encompass recoupment. Consider the somewhat "clunky" example of recoupment recently used by the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, with editing for substance and style in BOLD:
For example, if A were to buy a truck worth $1000 from B [Change
to "to buy a truck for $1,000 warranted to be in working condition"],
arguable that C "received a greater payment than others of his class." It is not even arguable that C received a section 547 preference.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).
118. 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY § 6-4

(1992). While "transfer" includes a setoff, section 547 does not include setoff. The only
provisions that limit setoff are sections 362, 363, and 553 ("Except as otherwise provided in
this section [553] and in sections 362 and 363 ...this title does not affect ....). 11 U.S.C.
§ 553. See Lynne P. Harrison & James J. DeCristofaro, Bankruptcy Setoff and Recoup-

ment, 861 PRAC. L. INST./COMM. 467, 476 (2004) ("Setoffs under Section 553 are by their
very nature 'preferences' that are sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Code."). Cf.In re Jenkins,
No. 03-60548, 2004 WL 768574, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2004) ("While a setoff may seem to

have the effect of a preference, 'it is a long recognized right and is generally favored.').
119. Theodore Roosevelt once said in a speech in St. Louis on May 31, 1916,
One of our defects as a nation is a tendency to use what have been called
weasel words. When a weasel sucks eggs, it sucks the meat out of the egg
and leaves it an empty shell. If you use a weasel word after another there is
nothing left of the other.
A. GARNER, GARNER'S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 826-27 (2003).
120. 1 EmI-TEIN, NICKLES & WHITE, supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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but A finds that he must expend [spend 1 21 ] $100 to put the truck
back into working condition, A might send B a check for only $900.
...Had

B filed for bankruptcy protection, A could recoup the $100

prepetition debt from B.122

In the First Circuit's truck hypothetical, B has a property right as a
result of the truck transaction but B' s property right is a right to be paid
$900. Even before A asserted any right of recoupment, B's right as a
result of the truck transaction was only a right to be paid $900.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained
in In re United States Abatement Corp., 23 "We have held that the trustee
of a bankruptcy estate 'takes the property subject to the rights of recoupment.' In other words, to the extent that a party is entitled to recoupment
of funds, the 'debtor has no interest in the funds."' 24
Accordingly, recoupment by A in the First Circuit's truck hypothetical
is not an "event that results in eliminating or diluting the debtor's interest
in property."' 25 Recoupment is thus not a "transfer" as defined in Bankruptcy Code section 101. Recoupment is thus not a preference. The
bankruptcy preference policy is not a reason for a more restrictive right
of recoupment in bankruptcy.

121. According to Bryan Garner, "Expend is a formal word that often seems less appropriate than spend." BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER'S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 330

(2003).
122. In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d 1,3 (1st Cir. 2004). The First Circuit
provided a similar but clearer example in an earlier opinion, United Structures of Am., Inc.
v. G.R.G. Eng'g S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1993):

If Smith sues Jones for $ 10,000 for grain that Smith supplied, and Jones seeks

to reduce the judgment by $5,000 representing Jones' expenditure [not as bad
as "expend," but still clunky] to dry out Smith's (defectively) wet grain (or
the cost of buying replacement grain, or the grain's lost value), Jones is seeking a recoupment.
See also the "recoupment scenario" in Craig H. Averch & Blake L. Berryman, Getting Out
of the Code: When Equitable Remedies Obtain Priority Over General Unsecured Claims, 5
J.BANKR. L. & PRAC. 285, 287-88 (1996). But cf.In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 306 B.R. 20,
25 (D.R.I. 2004) ("In basing its decision on recoupment analysis, the Bankruptcy Court
overlooked the fact that the issue of recoupment arises only where there are two reciprocal
obligations and it is necessary to determine whether one can be offset against the other.
There is no need to consider recoupment when there is a single obligation to the debtor
and the only issue is whether the amount in question must be deducted in order to calculate the sum owed to the debtor. In such cases, since the debtor has no claim to the
amount in question, there is nothing that can be offset. Furthermore, the amount in question cannot be part of the debtor's estate.").
123. 79 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
124. Id. at 398. In this quotation from the Fifth Circuit's United States Abatement opinion, the court quotes from its earlier opinion in Holford v. Powers, 896 F.2d 176, 179 (5th
Cir. 1990). One page earlier in the Fifth Circuit's United States Abatement opinion, the
court quoted from the Tenth Circuit's opinion in In re B&L Oil Co., 782 F.2d 155, 157
(10th Cir. 1986) (recoupment "sometimes allows particular creditors preference over
others") and from a bankruptcy court opinion in In re Fiero Prods., Inc., 102 B.R. 581, 586
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (A[ Rjecoupment ...is an exception to the rule that no creditor of
a bankrupt shall receive preferential treatment."). Id. at 397.
125. 1 EI'STF'IN, NICKLE:S & WiirE, supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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B.

THE ROLE OF "EQUITY"

Some courts have used "equity" as a reason for a more restrictive right
of recoupment in bankruptcy. Consider, for example, In re University
Medical Center,12 6 a case under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.
University Medical Center filed its Chapter 11 petition on January 1,
1988.127 It owed the government for overpayments resulting from estimated payments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395(g). 128 The Third Circuit
ruled that the automatic stay barred the government from recouping
these overpayments.129 In so ruling, the court stated the doctrine of recoupment must be narrowly construed in the bankruptcy context:
[B]oth debts must arise out of a single integrated transaction so that
it would be inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of that
transaction without also meeting its obligations. Use of this stricter
standard for delineating the bounds of a transaction in the context of
recoupment is in accord with the principle that this doctrine, as a
exception to the automatic stay, should be
non-statutory, equitable
30
narrowly construed.1
We have two problems with this statement and the proposition that
"equity" supports a more restrictive right of recoupment in bankruptcy.
First, recoupment is not an "equitable exception to the automatic stay."
Recoupment is not any kind of exception to the automatic stay. Recoupment is not within the scope of the automatic stay. The automatic stay is
created by section 362. Paragraph (a) of section 362 describes the scope
of the stay. 131 The automatic stay of section 362 does not bar all postpetition collection activities by creditors. Note the prefatory language in section 362(a): "stay of."'1 32 The stay only applies to actions covered by one
of the numbered subsections in 362(a). Section 362(a)(1) and section
362(a)(6) require "a claim against the debtor."1 33 Recoupment is not a
"claim" against the debtor; it is a defense against the debtor's claim. Accordingly, neither section 362(a)(1) nor section 362(a)(6) stays
recoupment. 134
Other subsections of 362(a) stay only actions "against .

the estate."
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

35

. .

property of

In recoupment, the property of the estate is the debtor's

973 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1070.
Id.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1081.

131. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See In re Powell, 284 B.R. 573, 576 (Bankr. D. Md. 2002) ("Conceptually, however,

the automatic stay is not applicable. A defendant is not required to seek judicial approval
prior to recoupment because the 'right of recoupment does not constitute a debt .... "); see
also Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Setoff vs. Recoupment: To Lift the Stay or Not,
That Is the Question, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 41 (2003) ("Thus, recoupment. in its
doctrinal definition, is not a violation of the automatic stay because it is not an attempt to
collect a debt.").
135. 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(2)-(4).
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right to be paid limited by any right of recoupment. At the time of the
debtor's bankruptcy filing, the right to be paid becomes property of the
estate, already subject to any nonbankruptcy right of recoupment. 136 As
the federal district court for the Southern District of New York recently
explained, "Recoupment . . .is not subject to the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362, 'because funds subject to recoupment are not the
debtor's property.'"137
Second, we are concerned by the Third Circuit's use of the words "inequitable" and "equity." Numerous reported cases on recoupment in
bankruptcy begin the discussion of recoupment with a statement such as
"in light of the equitable nature of recoupment, ' 138 suggesting (although
never expressly holding) that the equitable nature of recoupment should
restrict recoupment in bankruptcy. There is no more "equity" to recoupment in bankruptcy than to recoupment outside of bankruptcy. And,
there is not that much "equity" to recoupment outside of bankruptcy.
Recoupment is based on the existence of a defense arising out of the
same transaction as the plaintiff's claim. Recoupment does not create the
defense; equity did not create the defense. 39 Equity's development of
recoupment did not change the common law of contracts or torts-it did
not create new substantive rights. Recoupment was merely the equity
courts' innovation on the restrictions of common law pleading.
Courts outside of bankruptcy do not restrict a creditor's exercise of the
right of recoupment because of the possible impact on the other party to
the transaction or to third parties. The test for recoupment outside of
bankruptcy is a "same transaction" test, not an "inequitable" test. Similarly, courts in bankruptcy should apply that same "same transaction" test
in determining whether there is a right of recoupment. Bankruptcy
courts should not restrict the right of recoupment because of the possible
impact of recoupment on the debtor or other creditors. 140 There is noth136. As the Fifth Circuit has stated: "We have held that the trustee of a bankruptcy
estate 'takes the property subject to the rights of recoupment.' In other words, to the
extent that a party is entitled to have recoupment of funds, 'the debtor has no interest in
the funds."' In re United States Abatement, 79 F.3d at 398.
137. Ferguson v. Lion Holding, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 484, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting
In re Malinowski, 156 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1998)). See also Donald S. Bernstein &
Pamela Arnstein, Current Developments: Setoff and Recoupment, in 767 PRAC. L. INsr.,
COM. L. AND PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 371, 385-86 (1998).
138. See, e.g., In re Malinowski, 156 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1998): see also Sims v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 225 B.R. 709, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
139. But see Reab v. McAllister, 8 Wend. 109, 115 (N.Y. 1831) ("There is a natural
equity, especially as to claims arising out of the same transaction, that one claim should
compensate the other, and that the balance only should be recovered.... But the common
law of England required . .. separate actions .. "),as quoted in Michael Tigar, Comment,
Automatic Extinction of Cross-Demands: Compensationfrom Rome to California,53 CAL.
L. REv. 224, 254 (1965).
140. But see In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 296 B.R. 414, 422 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 2002) ("[T~he court is not in a position to determine whether or not McLane has a right
of recoupment. However, even if McLane has a valid right to recoup, the court believes
that the potential injury to debtors far outweighs the potential harm to McLane ... ").
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ing in the equitable nature of recoupment to support a more restrictive
right of recoupment in bankruptcy.
Recall that setoff has the same equitable origins as recoupment. And,
recall that section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code provides "except to the
extent that the court ... based on the equities of the case orders otherwise.11 41 If the equitable nature of setoff supported a more restrictive
right of setoff in bankruptcy, there would be no reason for such a provision in section 553. And, there is nothing in the equitable nature of bankruptcy to support a more restrictive right of recoupment in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy courts are commonly described as being or having the
powers of courts of equity. In 1939, in Pepper v. Litton,' 4 2 the Supreme
Court stated, "[I]n the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction the bankruptcy court has the power to sift the circumstances surrounding any
claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of
the bankrupt estate." 143 Recent reported bankruptcy decisions contain
similar statements. For example on June 24, 2004, a United States district
court in In re Cybridge Corp.144 stated: "Bankruptcy courts have long
possessed equity jurisdiction in order to safeguard against unjust
results."

145

At the time of Pepper v. Litton in 1939, there was clear statutory support for such statements. Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided in pertinent part that "courts of bankruptcy. .. are hereby invested
• . . with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to
exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings .... ,,146 And in
1978 Congress enacted section 1481 of Title 28 which stated that a "bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity."' 47 In 1984, however, when the provisions of title 28 were amended making the
bankruptcy court a "unit" of the district court, section 1481 was repealed.' 48 At the present time, unlike at the time of Pepper v. Litton,
nothing in the Bankruptcy Code 149 or related statutes gives equity juris141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
*2 (D.

11 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
308 U.S. 295 (1939).
Id. at 307-08.
312 B.R. 262 (D. N.J. 2004).
Id. at 269. See also In re DESA Holdings Corp., No. 02-11672, 2004 WL 316451. at
Del. Feb. 9, 2004) ("a bankruptcy court in passing on claims 'sits as a court of equity.

146.
Act of
147.
148.

Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 545, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326.
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 328 (1995).
Celotex, 514 U.S. at 329.

149. There are cases that cite section 105 as statutory authority for using supplemental
equitable principles in bankruptcy. E.g., In re Miller, 377 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2004)
(equitable powers under section 105 support the granting of a partial discharge); In re BLI
Farms, 312 B.R. 606, 620 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (equitable powers under section 105 support
substantive consolidation). The senior co-author of this article (writing with another coauthor with a name similar to "'Nockles") has already written about section 105 and bankruptcy courts as courts of equity. Steve H. Nickles & David G. Epstein, Another Way of
Thinking About Section 105(A) and Other Sources of Supplemental Law Under the Bankruptcv Code, 3 CHAP. L. Ri v. 7, 13-17 (2000) [It should be noted that I did not receive a
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diction to bankruptcy courts that is different from or greater than the
equity jurisdiction of a federal district court.' 50
And, even if there were a real and lawful basis for bankruptcy judges to
assume the role of equity chancellors, such a role would not give them
legitimate reason to change or restrict the law of recoupment. As one of
the leading treatises on equity points out: "the broad and fruitful principles of equity have been established and can not be changed by judicial
action." 1 5 '
Consider again the first case considered in this article, In re Holyoke
Nursing Home, Inc.,152 the most recent United States Court of Appeals
decision on recoupment in bankruptcy. There the debtor argued that
even if there was a right of recoupment under nonbankruptcy law, "recoupment is an equitable doctrine, and therefore the case should be remanded to the bankruptcy court to determine the appropriate equitable
balance to be struck. .. 153 The First Circuit properly rejected this plea
for further equitable balancing to restrict the right of recoupment in
bankruptcy, 154 and the First Circuit also properly rejected the notion that
bankruptcy courts have some sort of a "roving commission to do
equity."155
C.

ROLE OF STATE LAW AND OTHER NON-BANKRUPTCY LAW
(HEREINAFTER "STATE LAW")

There are many hard questions about the role of State law in resolving
disputes in bankruptcy. 56 The question of the role of State Law in
resolving disputes in bankruptcy regarding recoupment is not one of
those hard questions.
The Bankruptcy Code does not create a right of recoupment. The
Bankruptcy Code does not even mention recoupment. If there is a right
of recoupment in bankruptcy, it is based on State Law.
Compare again the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of recoupment and
the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of setoff. While the Bankruptcy Code
generous grant for writing that
colon. I did receive a nice polo
150. See generally Honorable
Equity: What Does That Mean?,

article-perhaps it was because the title did not have a
shirt with a "Chapman Law" logo that I still wear. DE]
Marcia A. Krieger, The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of
50 S.C. L. REV. 275 (1999).
151. 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 59 (5th ed. 1941). The Supreme Court made a similar point in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance
Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999), holding that the equity jurisdiction conferred on
federal courts by the 1789 Judiciary Act did not empower a court to freeze assets for the
benefit of creditors. The Court stated, "We do not question the proposition that equity is

flexible, but in the federal system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad
boundaries of traditional equitable relief." Id. at 332.
152. 372 F.3d I (tst Cir. 2004).
153. Id. at 4-5.
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id. (quoting In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc'y, Inc., 124 F.3d 22, 27 (lst Cir. 1997)).
156. See generally Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases, 47
N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 631 (1972); Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 633 (2004).
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does not create a right of setoff, section 553 in essence provides for a
more restrictive right of setoff in bankruptcy. Congress could have used
the phrase "recoupment or setoff"'157 in section 553 and expressly provided a more restrictive right of recoupment in bankruptcy, but it did not.
Bankruptcy Code restrictions on setoff in bankruptcy are consistent
with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Setoff involves two separate transactions: the debtor has rights against someone arising from one
transaction and that nondebtor party is asserting rights against the debtor
arising from a second, separate transaction. In general, the Bankruptcy
Code treats each transaction separately. For example, the preference requirements of section 547(b) are applied separately to each payment to a
creditor. Each debt owed to a creditor is tested separately under section
507 in determining the priority of that claim.
Similarly, the absence of Bankruptcy Code restrictions on recoupment
is consistent with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Recoupment
involve rights from the same transaction. That transaction is the basis for
the debtor's rights against the third party, the property of the estate.
While "property of the estate" is a phrase in section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code and section 541 uses the phrase "interests of the debtor in
property," courts [and the Court] have looked to State Law to determine
the "interests of the debtor in property."' t 58 Consider again the words of
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
the Beatles and the United
"all that we are saying is' ' 159 "the trustee of a bankruptcy estate 'takes the
property subject to the rights of recoupment [under State Law]." In
of funds
other words, to the extent that a party is entitled to recoupment
160
[under State Law], the debtor has no interest in the funds."'
CONCLUSION
One of the nice things about doing this article is that it will be easy to
gauge how persuasive these ideas are. Our goal is simply to eliminate
reported opinions such as the Second Circuit's opinion in In re McMahon,16 1 that first discusses "Recoupment Under New York Law" 16 2 and
157. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-340 (2000) (Effectiveness of Right of Recoupment or Set-Off
Against Deposit Account).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
159. John Lennon, Give Peace a Chance, on SHAVED FIsii (Capitol 1975); lyrics available at http://www.geocities.com/lyrics-archive/john-lennon/songs/GivePeace-aChance.

htm
Some readers may be puzzled by our linking the Beatles and the Fifth Circuit's statement
on recoupment. At the height of the Beatles' popularity in the late 1960's, rumors spread
that Paul McCartney had died in a car accident in 1966 and had been replaced by a lookalike. It was claimed that if you played the ending of "I Am the Walrus" backwards you
could hear all the other Beatles saying "Paul is dead." http://www.brainyencyclopedia.

com/encyclopedia/p/pa/paul is-dead.html. We of course believe that if you can figure out
how to play a record backwards, what you will hear is the Fifth Circuit [not the Beatles]
saying "'recoupment is what we said."
160. In re United States Abatement, 79 F.3d at 398.
161. 129 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1997).
162. Id. at 96.
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then separately discusses "Recoupment in Bankruptcy."1 6 3
Recoupment in bankruptcy is whatever recoupment is under state law.
In New York bankruptcy cases, "recoupment in bankruptcy" is the same
as "recoupment under New York law." If a bankruptcy court can not
determine whether there are two apples or an apple and an orange, it can
and should look not only to bankruptcy cases on recoupment but also to
non-bankruptcy cases. Two apples outside of bankruptcy are two apples
in bankruptcy. Anything else is a fruit basket turnover.

163. hd.

